Contracting with the State in Turbulent Times: How Public Procurement Mediation Saves Projects from Collapse
/ 20 November 2026 14:32
13 min to read
In the world of government contracts and major infrastructure projects, winning a tender frequently marks not the beginning of successful cooperation, but entry into a legal trap. Imagine a typical scenario: a private construction or engineering company wins a large-scale state tender or enters a long-term public-private partnership to build a strategic bridge, a regional hospital, or an energy facility. At the outset, the project’s financial model is calculated down to the last cent, and the work schedule is mapped out for years ahead. Yet within just a few months, the external economic reality shifts dramatically: inflation accelerates, exchange rates surge, established logistics routes break down, and the cost of steel, cement, specialized equipment, and fuel jumps by thirty-five to forty percent.
At this exact moment, the business finds itself in a dead end created by the very nature of a public contract. Public procurement legislation in most countries strictly restricts altering the price, scope of work, or completion deadlines of a contract once the tender is awarded, viewing any flexibility as a potential corruption loophole. The contractor physically cannot continue building at a loss, as doing so drives the company straight toward bankruptcy, so work on the site slows down or grinds to a halt. The contracting authority, for its part, categorically refuses to sign an addendum revising the cost estimate out of fear of accusations of embezzling budget funds, unilaterally terminates the contract, calls in the bank performance guarantee, and files a lawsuit seeking multi-million-dollar penalties.
The distinct nature of conflicts in public procurement and public-private partnerships lies in the collision between rigid administrative formalism and living economic dynamics. Unlike a private commercial contract, where two business owners can sit down over one evening to revise terms of cooperation and share unforeseen costs, a government contract is bound by public finances, strict budgetary discipline, political accountability, and long-term social obligations. When stringent anti-corruption safeguards operate without flexible dispute resolution tools, they paradoxically destroy public value, turning critically important facilities into stalled, unfinished projects. Recognizing this threat, leading European economies and international development banks have institutionalized specialized mediation between the state and business.
The Anatomy of a Public Finance Conflict: Caught Between Fear of Audit and Economic Reality
To understand why traditional litigation proves destructive for government contracts and concessions, one must examine the root causes of the disputes themselves. Most often, conflicts erupt over sharp spikes in the cost of raw materials and energy, force majeure delays in the delivery of imported equipment, or the discovery of hidden geological and technical defects after excavation or reconstruction work has already begun. In long-term public-private partnership projects—where a private investor builds a road, port, or municipal utility network at its own expense and recoups the investment over twenty years—acute disputes arise around availability payment formulas, changes in state tariff regulation, or delays by the state itself in allocating land plots and connecting facilities to utility grids.
The most toxic catalyst for escalation in the public sector is a psychological and institutional phenomenon that legal scholars refer to as civil servant paralysis. Heads of state-owned enterprises, municipal departments, and line ministries operate under the constant scrutiny of state auditors, courts of audit, and anti-corruption enforcement agencies. Even when a public manager clearly understands that a contractor’s request for price indexation or deadline extension is objectively justified by market indicators, signing a compromise agreement is perceived as signing one’s own indictment for abuse of office. Consequently, the official deliberately chooses inaction and pushes every conflict into the courts, hiding behind a judicial ruling as the only safe way to justify spending budget funds—even when that strategy ends up costing the state several times more.
Commercial courts handle disputes involving public procurement and concessions slowly, formalistically, and at an economic loss to both sides. Full-scale litigation across three court instances typically drags on for two to three years, accumulating complex construction, engineering, and forensic accounting examinations. While lawyers argue in courtrooms over the wording of tender documentation clauses, an unfinished bridge or hospital wing deteriorates under rain and frost, losing its structural integrity. Grants from international donors or targeted credit lines expire due to missed disbursement deadlines. Worst of all, after winning a formal victory in court and terminating the old contract, the state is forced to announce a new tender, which—due to accumulated inflation and lost time—costs taxpayers one and a half to two times more than reaching a compromise with the original contractor would have.
France, Britain, and Development Banks: How the World Legitimized Compromise with Public Authorities
Confronted with the colossal price of bureaucratic inflexibility, leading European nations and global financial institutions grasped a fundamental truth: abstract calls for officials to show flexibility will never work as long as the civil servant is left alone to face auditors and the criminal code. To unblock stalled infrastructure projects and public contracts, the world turned to establishing specialized mediation institutions. These mechanisms transformed compromise in public finance from a dangerous personal risk for an executive into a transparent, procedurally documented, and audit-proof process.
One of the most successful examples in continental Europe is the French institution of the Business Mediator, operating directly within the structure of the French Ministry of the Economy and Finance in the Bercy district of Paris. Originally created to combat late payments in private business, its mandate was subsequently expanded to resolve disputes between private suppliers and public contracting authorities at every level—from small municipalities and hospitals to national energy and transport corporations. Any contractor facing the impossibility of fulfilling a tender contract due to price surges or delays caused by the contracting authority can submit an electronic application, after which a state regional or national mediator steps into the case free of charge.
Negotiations in the French system last an average of two to three months and are conducted under strict confidentiality, removing the fear of public political pressure from officials. Yet the primary secret behind the effectiveness of this model—which resolves over seventy percent of referrals amicably—lies in the institutional legitimacy of the final document. A settlement agreement concluded under the auspices of a mediator appointed by the Ministry of the Economy and backed by objective cost calculations serves as an official legal shield for the public buyer. During subsequent inspections by the French Court of Audit, such a protocol clears the official of suspicions of improper favoritism or misappropriation of budget funds, proving that amending the contract terms was an economically justified step to preserve the public interest.
The United Kingdom built an equally pragmatic model, refining its public contracting philosophy in the wake of the high-profile collapse of construction giant Carillion, supply chain disruptions, and waves of inflationary shocks. Through dedicated Procurement Policy Notes and the principles of the Construction Playbook, the British government formally directed contracting authorities to move away from the punitive practice of terminating agreements and levying crippling penalties against good-faith suppliers. Instead of courtroom warfare, the government introduced a protocol for structured contract reviews involving an independent facilitator or mediator.
A central pillar of the British approach is pairing mediation with the principle of open-book accounting. To qualify for price indexation or a revised work schedule, the contractor transparently discloses its actual internal cost structure to an independent mediator and financial auditor. Once specialists confirm that the company is not seeking windfall profits at taxpayers’ expense, but merely covering objective increases in materials, logistics, or energy costs, the public authority gains lawful grounds to revise payment milestones, adjust cost estimates, or extend construction deadlines. This mechanism turns an adversarial dispute into joint crisis management for the project.
At the global level of major infrastructure concessions, multilateral development banks—primarily the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the World Bank Group—serve as the chief architects of mediation standards.
Public-private partnership projects are designed to span twenty or thirty years, and over such horizons, governments, tax rates, infrastructure demand, and macroeconomic conditions inevitably shift. If a dispute over building a toll highway, modernizing a port terminal, or constructing wastewater treatment facilities escalates into international investment arbitration in London or Paris, the physical project halts for years while loan and grant funds are frozen.
To prevent such scenarios, development banks embed mandatory multi-tiered dispute resolution clauses into standard public-private partnership agreements. Before the state or a private investor earns the right to file an arbitration claim, the contract requires them to pass through executive-level direct negotiations, seek a technical opinion from an independent engineering expert or dispute resolution board, and subsequently conduct full-scale mediation under the rules of leading international centers. Engaging mediators specializing in infrastructure finance enables the parties to carefully rebalance the concession’s financial model—for instance, by adjusting the formula for state availability payments, revising tariff schedules, or extending the concession term—keeping the project viable and bankable for lenders.
Comparative Analysis: Judicial Contract Termination vs. Procurement Mediation
Contrasting the traditional practice of judicial termination of public contracts with specialized procurement mediation makes it clear that in the realm of public finance, a formal victory in court often translates into a defeat for the public interest. When a private supplier disputes a contract with a private buyer, the matter usually revolves around monetary compensation. In public procurement and public-private partnerships, however, the primary goal is a tangible material outcome for the community or state—a completed bridge, a heating plant launched on time, a renovated hospital, or an uninterrupted supply of medicines. Judicial contract termination delivers none of these public goods, whereas mediation is specifically engineered to rescue and complete the project.
The first and most tangible advantage of mediation lies in the speed of conflict resolution and the preservation of the asset’s real value. When a contracting authority chooses unilateral contract termination and turns to the commercial court, the project stalls for years. While the case moves through three judicial instances and undergoes complex construction and technical examinations, the half-built infrastructure degrades under harsh weather conditions, demanding extra spending on mothballing and eventual restoration. Even after securing a court ruling, the state must spend months drafting new tender documentation and holding repeat auctions, where inflation and rising resource costs inevitably drive the price of works up by tens of percent. Mediation allows the parties to sit down at the negotiating table within weeks, verify objective economic calculations, agree on a fair price indexation formula or revised work schedule, and bring the facility into operation without wasting precious time.
The second critical dimension involves building a reliable legal shield for the public buyer itself. In the public sector, the chief obstacle to any compromise is an official’s fear of auditors and law enforcement. A unilateral decision by the head of a state enterprise or budget manager to alter contract terms always looks to oversight bodies like potential corrupt collusion with the contractor. Procurement mediation fundamentally reshapes this legal dynamic, shifting the agreement from behind-the-scenes discretion into a transparent, institutionally verified procedure. When a compromise agreement emerges under the guidance of a certified mediator, rests upon the findings of an independent pricing or engineering expert, and is recorded in an official mediation protocol, the public manager gains solid procedural protection proving the economic soundness of the decision for the budget.
The third factor—frequently overlooked during isolated disputes—is preserving healthy competition in the public procurement market. The practice of automatically terminating contracts over objective force majeure or inflationary shocks and subsequently placing companies on the Antimonopoly Committee’s blacklist of unscrupulous bidders drains the market of strong, experienced contractors. As a result, fewer qualified players participate in future tenders, lowering the quality of execution and pushing prices upward. Mediation makes it possible to distinguish outright fraudsters from good-faith businesses caught in severe economic headwinds, preserving trust between the state and the real sector of the economy.
What This Means for Ukraine: Prozorro, Reconstruction, and Relaunching PPPs
For Ukraine, introducing specialized mediation in public procurement and public-private partnerships is a cornerstone of successful national reconstruction and private capital attraction. Large-scale infrastructure projects, the rollout of decentralized energy generation, the construction of protective shelters, and the modernization of water utilities and municipal heating networks are being executed amidst unprecedented wartime risks. Relentless shelling, power outages, the mobilization of skilled workers, strained border logistics, and currency fluctuations make the rigid, unaltered execution of multi-year contracts based on initial tender bid calculations virtually impossible.
The Prozorro electronic procurement system revolutionized transparency in supplier selection, yet the contract execution phase remains hostage to excessive statutory over-regulation. The provisions of the Law of Ukraine “On Public Procurement” set exceedingly narrow boundaries for amending essential contract terms, and every supplementary agreement draws intense scrutiny from the State Audit Service of Ukraine and law enforcement agencies. A similar bottleneck stalls the relaunch of concessions and public-private partnerships: private investors, particularly international funds and major infrastructure operators, are reluctant to commit tens of millions of dollars to long-term projects in Ukraine if protracted litigation in domestic courts remains the sole avenue for resolving disputes over tariffs, land allocation, or force majeure.
To unlock this potential, Ukraine must take several sequential institutional steps. First and foremost, standard multi-tiered mediation clauses should be integrated directly into recommended Prozorro tender documentation for complex construction, engineering, and energy procurements, as well as into model concession agreements aligned with international financial institution standards. Including such a clause will obligate parties facing pricing or technical disagreements to first undergo a structured mediation process involving independent industry experts before resorting to contract termination.
At the same time, contractual mechanisms will only operate at full strength once public buyers receive clear statutory safety guarantees. Ukraine would do well to grant an institutional mandate for conducting mediation in public procurement and PPP projects to an authoritative independent body—for example, under the auspices of the Business Ombudsman Council or a specialized office within the Ministry of Economy—while explicitly codifying the obligation of the State Audit Service to recognize the outcomes of such mediation agreements when backed by independent expert valuation. Alongside this, the state and professional associations must cultivate a pool of specialized mediators with deep expertise in public finance, cost-estimate pricing, international donor procurement rules, and concession law. Shifting from a punitive culture of contract termination to civilized mediation dialogue will allow Ukraine to save billions of hryvnias in budget funds, accelerate the restoration of critical infrastructure, and demonstrate to international partners its capacity to manage complex investment projects effectively and transparently.